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PURPOSE

To Test Truman's Thesis
HE political interest group is a widely recognized and discussed
phenomenon; its importance and power in shaping public policy
and in giving character to the political climate of the day is seldom
disputed. There is, however, little agreement concerning its nature
and place in a theory of politics, or in a theory of the political process,
in which politics is thought of as a process of human or social relations
of a particular order. David B. Truman's book "The Governmental
Process" makes a bold and stimulating effort to present a theory of the
political process which will account for the role of the political interest
group.
It shall be the purpose of this article to take the ideas or theories
which Truman develops1 and apply them to a particular area of public
policy, with the thought in mind of testing them.
To THROW SOME LIGHT ON THE CHANGE IN C.A.B. POLICY
The purpose of this article, however, is not limited to seeking
answers to the above questions of theory. It also is hoped that some
light can be thrown on the particular area of public policy to be treated,
namely on the Civil Aeronautics Board's administration of Federal aid
to the air transport industry under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
Since the war much heated controversy has concerned itself with the
manner in which the C.A.B. has administered the airmail payments
1 Truman,

1951.

David B., ,The Governmental Process, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
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called for under the Act of 1938. Until 1949, the Board consistently
stood in opposition to all proposals and legislation offered for the purpose of having any subsidy which may be contained in mail -pay to
the airlines, separated from what merely is compensation for carrying
the mail. Our primary interest is in accounting for the reversal which
the C.A.B. made in 1949, when in principle it came out in favor of such
a separation, and later went on to support legislation to this effect. In
this respect two questions will be asked: (1) Why did the C.A.B.
change its mind and come out in favor of subsidy separation? And (2)
Can any predictions be made under 'any given conditions as to how
the C.A.B. is likely to behave in the future?
THREE CLASSES OF POLITICAL GROUPS

According to David B. Truman's definition and differentiations
of groups, there are three main classes of groups into which the behavior
and attitude patterns in our study may fall. They are: (1) The institutional groups of the Government. (2) The political interest groups
endeavoring to translate their claims into accepted policy. And, (3)
the relevant general attitudes and potential interest groups which
influence the issue.
The institutional groups of the Government make up the formal
structure of Government, and shape the many patterns of behavior
and expectations which define and determine the paths which policy
changes must take., We are dealing with a change in institutional
behavior and, in particular, the behavior of an "independent" regulatory commission; for though the C.A.B. is a relatively new agency,
its policy of not separating airmail subsidies has been carried on for
over ten years. We are concerned therefore With the formal organization of Government. But formal organization is only half of the picture. Though it determines where access is advantageous, the nature
of access and the interaction patterns between groups and Governmental officials often is informal. These are the most difficult factors to
determine.
The political interest groups can be identified more easily, at least
associations and formally organized groups, but evaluation of their
internal politics and cohesion is difficult, as it is in their interest to
keep internal conflicts undisclosed. The appearance of unity is important to the success of their claims. But some knowledge of the
political interest groups, their attitudes, membership, organization, and
techniques and strength, will be necessary to evaluate their role in the
separation issue. We shall be concerned with the railroads, the certificated airlines, the non-skeds, the cargo carriers, the steamship lines, and
others.
And last, the most vague thing with which we shall have to deal,
are the relevant general attitudes and potential interests. There can be
little doubt that they play an important part in shaping private and
public attitudes and behavior in this issue, but much of their signifi-
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cance must be grasped intuitively. Some of these attitudes are those
subsumed under Truman's "democratic mold," others are, a public
dislike particularly for hidden subsidies, and a desire for economy and
efficiency, as manifested by the popularity of the Hoover Commission.
The Truman theory assumes that the political process is made up
of attitude and behavior patterns. The reason for emphasizing groups
is that they are the basis of uniformities of behavior and of differentiations in the interactions of men. Public policy, therefore, is the established attitude and behavior patterns of Government. Politics is not
only coercive, it also is persuasive; it is a two way relation.
FACTORS DETERMINING

C.A.B.

POLICY

Since Governmental policy is an interaction pattern, an attitude and
behavior pattern, C.A.B. policy must be determined by the particular
character of the C.A.B.'s interactions as an institutional group of Government. The changes in the C.A.B.'s attitude and behavior towards
the issue of airmail subsidy separation, therefore, may be said to be
determined by two related factors: (1) the external relations, patterns
of interaction, of the Board with the different groups involved, and
(2) the internal cohesion of the C.A.B., i.e., the nature of its own group
politics. The character of its external and internal relations is composed
of institutional attitudes and behavior, and the informal and dynamic
aspects of group life and politics. Truman's ideas thus furnish us with
a broad framework within which we may describe the formulation of
policy, but it also is apparent that an appraisal of the character and
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relative significance of the many interaction patterns which determine
policy, requires considerable subjective evaluation.
The external relations of the C.A.B. may be said to be composed of
four main interaction patterns, whose nature and importance make
them influential in the formulation of policy. They are: (1) C.A.B.
relations with the airline industry, (2) C.A.B. relations with Congress,
(3) C.A.B. relations with the President and Executive Branch agencies,
and (4) C.A.B. relations with general attitudes and potential interest
groups.
Because the C.A.B. is an "independent" regulatory commission
administering to a single industry, the character of its relations with
the industry it regulates is of cliental nature and therefore is a powerful determinant of policy.
Its commission form of organization and operation causes C.A.B.
relations with Congress to take on added importance. Its interactions
with Congress are most frequent with the committees which are concerned with aviation matters. Interactions with groups in Congress
with which the airline industry and other interested groups achieve
access also become very important.
Although regulatory commissions often are thought of as bound
closely to Congress and free from the political climate in which Executive departments function, it is easy to underestimate the importance
of the C.A.B.'s relations with the President and other Federal agencies.
Interactions with the President and the Budget Bureau, the Post Office
Department, the Department of Commerce, and inter-agency committees, such as the Air Coordinating Committee, can and often do have
an important effect on C.A.B. policy decisions.
C.A.B. interactions with generally held attitudes and potential
interest groups also may influence the course of policy. They help
create the climate in which policy is formulated. Because of its commission form of organization and relations, the effect on C.A.B. policy of
general attitudes and potential interests more often is likely to be
indirect, i.e., through its relations with the industry, the Congress, and
the Executive.
The interaction patterns of the C.A.B. with other Government
groups, political interest groups, and potential interest groups are
themselves the function of the group life and external relations of
these groups. Therefore, we must concern ourselves with the relevant
interaction patterns affecting the attitudes and behavior of Congress,
the political interest groups, and the Executive agencies involved in the
subsidy separation issue. In Congress the attitudes and behavior of theInterstate and Foreign Commerce Committees, the Appropriations
Committees, and the Post Office Committees, and the external relations of these committees to the airline industry, other political interest groups, the President and other agencies, and to the general attitudes and potential interests, are of particular importance.
If C.A.B. policy is a function of its ifteraction patterns, i.e., its
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internal cohesion and external relations, and we have been correct in
identifying the major determining patterns of interaction, the following propositions should hold true:
(1) A change in Board policy ought to reflect a change in the attitudes and behavior of the groups with which it carries on its
most important relations.
(2) The degree to which the Board moves from an established
policy to a new policy should reflect the degree and extent to
which the attitudes and behavior of the above groups have
changed.
(3) Given sufficient cohesion within the Board on a policy question, policy should tend to remain unchanged until its external
relations have become sufficiently disturbing, i.e., the Board's
success in warding off a change in policy will depend on its
internal cohesion.
The degree to which we find these propositions to be true will offer us
some degree of verification of Truman's thesis. If these propositions
hold true, it follows, that on the basis of a knowledge of the most significant Board interaction patterns, under given conditions, it should
be possible to make some predictions as to how the Board will act on
certain issues.
BACKGROUND

OF THE AIRMAIL SUBSIDY

ISSUE

Following World War II an air of optimism prevailed in the air
transport industry and in the Government circles concerned with the
formulation and administration of the national policy towards civil
aviation. The aircraft manufacturers expected the heyday of wartime
production to end, but the airlines and vocal public opinion expected
commercial and private flying to become the thing of the day. An
aviation age surely was upon usl This would mean continuing prosperity for all of civil aviation, though perhaps not on as large a scale
for the manufacturers of aircraft.
Much of this optimism was the outgrowth of the important role
aviation had played during the war. The airlines had been through a
period of unprecedented prosperity and full load capacity, and a system of Government priorities had been required to keep away the
business they could not handle. These facts stood in sharp contrast to
the difficult days the airlines had experienced since their early development, although they had begun to show signs of financial strength in
the years immediately preceding the war. But it was expected that they
were going into the final stage of self-sufficiency, when they no longer
would be dependent upon large air mail payments beyond the reasonable cost of flying the mail.
The Civil Aeronautics Board in its administration of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, "the magnum opus" of the national policy of
promotion and regulation of civil aviation, showed that it was no ex-
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ception to this spirit of optimism about the future of air travel. It
granted new certificates of convenience and necessity, increased the
route pattern of the nation many fold, and instituted a whole system
of costly new feeder lines. The airlines followed with purchases of
new and larger aircraft with greater load capacities, and expansion
brought with it increased passenger business.
But in spite of this unprecedented expansion and increase in business, in the winter of 1946-1947, and at a time when American business
was enjoying an unheralded prosperity, the air transport industry
headed into a financial depression as severe perhaps as the industry
had ever experienced. To make matters worse, expansion had been
accompanied by inefficient service, and both public and private complaints began to mount. A series of dramatic air crashes also occurred
which gave rise to several Congressional and Governmental investigations in 1947. Therefore, in spite of a great increase in traffic over 1945,
the airlines began to lose money in 1946. It was in this setting that
the issue of the separation of airmail subsidies began to be heard.
The Civil Aeronautics Board was in a difficult position. Its post
war policy of expansion and encouragement of competition by the
granting of many new route certificates was proving unprofitable" to
the airlines. If the airlines were to survive, they were going to need
increased Government aid, aid which it appeared was, necessary to some
extent because of the C.A.B.'s optimistic polities. Under the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, direct financial assistance to the airlines was
administered by the C.A.B. through the awarding of air mail payments
to carriers it had certified under the Act. The Act definitely contemplated a policy of promotion through air mail payments, the "need"
provision of the Act requiring that the C.A.B. take into account:
the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to
enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient
management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required
for the commerce of the United States, and the postal service, and
the national defense. [52 Stat. Sec. 406(b)]

The Board therefore set the mail rate for a carrier at a figure which
provided enough additional income to close the gap between non-mail
revenues and expenses incurred under what the Board determined
was honest, economic and efficient management, with enough left over
as a profit.
Before the reversal of expectations of airline prosperity, the C.A.B.
held that some of the rates for mail had already become or were becoming compensatory, i.e., it was felt that they contained little or no element of subsidy, reflecting merely the cost of carrying the mail. The
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 did not require that subsidy be separated from that portion of the mail payments which merely was corn-
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/pensatory, but it was-predicated on the assumption that the airlines
would eventually become self supporting, and that the period of Government assistance under the act was to be temporary. When the law
was enacted the airlines were thought of as being in a developmental
stage requiring Federal aid, and it was expected that airmail payments
beyond the cost of carrying the mail would diminish as the industry
reached maturity. Development would lead to self sufficiency.
The law also set up an unusual procedure for paying the airlines.
Although the Post Office Department had some part in rate proceedings and in the awarding of routes, its role was very minor. Nevertheless,
the Post Office was required to pay the airmail bill out of its budget.
It therefore had to appear before the Congressional Appropriations
Committees with a "fait accompli." Because of this procedure the
CA.B. was not required to justify its policy or awards to the Budget
Bureau or to any Congressional committee, except indirectly in connection with its own budget. The "cost plus" manner of determining air
mail rates and the charging of the Board's awards against the Post Office
budget were two major objections which constantly were to be raised
against the national policy as administered by the C.A.B.
C.A.B. POLIcY TOWARD THE AIR MAIL SUBSIDY
The Period from 1946 to 1949: Against Separation

THE CHANGES IN

ISSUE

We have shown that during' the period from 1946 to 1949 the airlines
went from a state of prosperous expansion into a severe economic
depression. It was not until 1949 that the carriers, largely through the
help of mail rate increases granted by the C.A.B., began to recover
from their plight. It was against this background of economic difficulties that criticism of the airlines and Board policy in coping with the
situation developed into a strong movement to force the Board to separate the subsidy from mail pay. But from 1946 until 1949 the C.A.B.
was able to hold out against the efforts to change its policy.
During 1947 great stress was put on the C.A.B.'s relations with the
airline industry. The industry expected the Board to bail the airlines
out of their financial crisis by increased mail rates, but Chairman
James Landis and his associates were hesitant to move too rapidly.
Criticism from Congress and hostile interest groups could fairly place
a share of responsibility on the Commission for its excessive postwar
optimism. Moreover, airline financing techniques were open to some
criticism, and Landis wanted to encourage the carriers to follow less
objectionable fiscal procedures.
The Board, however, decided to increase mail rates, and this policy
was pursued until recovery appeared in 1949, and 1950. But the-airlines thought that the Board was much too slow. Criticism of the rate
making procedure was frequent and spread to Congress and other
quarters in Government. At one instance it had been estimated that
the Commission was two years behind in its work, and it appears that
administrative inefficiency was influential in Landis' failure to be re-
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appointed in December. Yet behind the pulls and strains of the Board's
industry relations one finds a continuing cliental relationship. The
Board and the industry were seldom very far apart in attitude, and as
we shall see there is a strong correlation between changes in Board
policy and changes in airline attitudes and behavior.
In Congress there was a great play of group interactions. It was
there that those interests which were most hostile to the C.A.B. and the
airlines, hoped to make themselves felt. Access through the President
and the other agencies concerned with C.A.B. policy usually was more
difficult to achieve, and because the C.A.B. has a single clientele and a
commission form of organization, the value of such acceis was diminished. These interests usually were the airline's competitors and they
had certain access to the House and Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committees, because these committees handled all transportation legislation and policy. The unusual relationship of the Post
Office Department to C.A.B. proceedings, and the method by which
airmail payments were appropriated and paid through the Post Office
budget also made the Appropriation Committees and committees
handling Post Office matters significant points of access.
A report issued in December of 1946 by the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce presents a good picture of political
interest group attitudes and behavior in the transportation field.2 The
responses to the Lea Committee's transportation inquiry were in the
form of answers to questionnaires dealing with the national transportation policy, and since they were submitted before the airline depression in the winter of 1946-1947, the report is especially helpful in
identifying these group attitudes which traditionally have been hostile
to the C.A.B. policy of airline subsidization. In response to questions
related to the policy of Federal aid to transportation, of 131 answers
117, or approximately 90%, of the respondents were against Federal aid
except where private capital could not or would not provide the service.8 Of 70'answers to the question, "Is present policy of Federal aid
4
unjust to anyone?" 60 respondents believed that it was.
At that time the separation of airmail subsidies had not become an
issue, but the railroads and' their various organizations,-the Association
of American Railroads, Railway Age, etc., singled out for attack the
aid received by the airlines. They strongly advocated user charges, and
endorsed the cost principle of pricing in transportation. Other organizations with memberships dependent on rail transportation felt that
there were inequities in the present national policy of aid, and the
A.A.R. felt that a remedy could be found in placing the regulation of
all transportation agencies in one regulatory commission. The most
powerful airline industry association also responded to the House inquiry. The Air Transport Association of America favored Federal aid
2 House Report No. 2735, 79th Congress 2nd Session, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
3Ibid., p. 164.
4 Ibid., p. 175.
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to new modes of transportation in their beginning stages. It replied
that the amount of money given the airlines was less to date when compared to the amount used to aid all other forms of transportation,
except for the pipe lines. It found no inequities in present national aid
and it pointed out that air mail rates have followed a trend toward
lower rates since 1941; the A.T.A. also asserted that the C.A.B. regarded
its 60 and 45 cent (per ton mile) rates as compensatory.
Previous to the fall of 1946 the trend of rates (since 1941) had been
downward, and the industry was engaged with the C.A.B. in a profitable expansion. C.A.B. relations were stable and airmail policy was
in a state of relative equilibrium. Although the industry's rapid expansion had shrunk the profit margin of the previous year, the C.A.B.
reported that the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946 had been profitable,
and the Board expected substantial improvement during the coming
year.5 Inter-agency relations also were satisfactory, and there did not
appear to be any general attitudes or potential interests in play which
would change the course of policy.
When the newly elected Republican 80th Congress met in January of 1947, the situation had changed radically. The airline expansion
not only had turned into a severe depression, but it had brought with
it inefficient service and a series of dramatic air crashes. Representative
Margaret Chase Smith said in January that Congress ought to conduct
an investigation of the carriers' inefficiency and bad service. In August
of the previous year Fortune magazine had run a critical article on this
aspect of the airline expansion. 6 Investigations of airline accidents and
the safety problem began in both the House and Senate under the
leadership of Interstate and Foreign Commerce committeemen.
Criticism of the airlines and C.A.B. for overselling aviation came
from Secretary Harriman of the Commerce Department. The historic
interest of the Commerce Department in civil aviation, and its success
in acquiring jurisdiction over the Civil Aeronautics Administration in
the reorganization of the old Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1940,
made this a foreboding gesture for the Board and the industry which
have always been jealous of the C.A.B.'s independence. The attitude
of the Commerce Secretary could affect relations with the President
and the Board's important relations with the C.A.A. and the Air Coordinating Committee,
Increased activity of the Board's traditional enemies, the railroads,
and the shipping interests which wished to secure entrance into the
airline business also took place. The Sea-Air Committee, representing
steamship interests, and in particular the Waterman Steamship Company, began a publicity campaign in connection with its effort to secure
legislation which would aid steamship companies to get certificates. of
convenience and necessity from the C.A.B., certificates which were
required to operate air transportation in conjunction with sea travel.
5 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1946.

Washington, D. C.
6"What's Wrong With the Airlines?", Fortune Magazine, August, 1946.
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The airlines and the Board traditionally had been opposed to the entrance of either water or land carriers into the air business. Claims
were made that certain steamship companies could operate various
routes without subsidy. An important application for a certificate by a
steamship company was before the Board, and when it was denied in
March the Sea-Air Committee began a concerted campaign to get legislation through Congress. The strains on the Board relations attending
the Sea-Air case caused Chairman Landis to criticize the "pressures
built up inside and outside of Government." 7
The steamship 'companies were successful in achieving access to the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and Representative Miller of Connecticut introduced the first of several Sea-Air bills
in March. Support for the steamship case was forthcoming from Representative Wolverton, the chairman of the Committee, and it appeared
that relations between certain of the Committee's members and the
Waterman Co., the most outspoken line, were close, for on the eve of
open hearings on the Sea-Air bills in Washington, Chairman Wolverton
and other members of his Committee were guests of the Waterman
Company on a Central American Inaugural flight. But in spite of
strong support the steamship companies were not successful in getting
the House Committee to report out a bill. The effect of this episode,
however, was to broaden the issue of airmail subsidies.
The Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee appeared
more charitably disposed to the airlines' plight and to the C.A.B.'s
problems, and in March 1947 it unanimously withdrew permission
to one of its sub-committees to investigate the airline financial conditions, feeling that an investigation at that time might seriously weaken
public confidence in them. But the Senate Appropriations Committee
t6ok a strongly critical attitude towards C.A.B. policy. Senator Reed
said he was tempted to seek an investigation of airmail subsidies, and
he and other Senators at public hearings said that they were not sure
whether the law should be changed so subsidy amounts would be appropriated directly. Senator Reed's committee also gave Board members Oswald Ryan and Harllee Branch a difficult time at hearings in
connection with a supplementary Post Office Appropriation bill. In its
final report the Committee made a strong recommendation that the
Senate consider legislation which would separate airmail subsidies.
Some people felt that the railroads had access to,Senator Reed.
Other interests generally hostile to the favored position of the certificated carriers and to C.A.B. policy began to take form. In connection with the applications of various air freight forwarders to operate
under Board auspices, the Air Freight Forwarders Association was
formed in February in an effort to aid their cause. This pattern of
interactions grew so that cooperative efforts also were worked out with
the non-certificated cargo carriers through their association, the Independent Air Freight Association. In time, the cargo carriers, the non7Aviation Daily, March 24, 1946.
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skeds, and the group servicing them became eager witnesses before
airline and airmail investigations.
By the middle of 1947 fear for the aircraft industry and the effect
of the general aviation plight on national defense crystallized into two
movements for the investigation of national aviation policy, and as
many expected attention also was drawn to the question of airmail subsidies and subsidy separation. Although there was some rivalry between
these two movements, the one Presidential and the other Congressional,
and some question as to whether the President might veto Congressional action, both the President's Air Policy Commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board were set up, and their relations were
unexpectedly cooperative. Fbrmed a few days earlier in July, 1947,
the Presidential body took the lead, but reports were not forthcoming
until January and March respectively of 1948.
While these groups were at work, upon Presidential request, the
Air Coordinating Committee issued in August 1947 a statement of
policies giving some indication of the temper of Executive attitudes
towards airmail subsidies.7a Though general and cautious in its tone,
the Committee affirmed the principle of need payments under the Civil
Aeronautics Act and the philosophy of aid during the developmental
stage. There was no mention of separation, but the Committee said
that the payment of subsidies requires the strict tests of the usefulness
of an operation to commerce and the national defense. Chairman
Landis was the Co-Chairman of the Committee.
The C.A.B.'s relations had been strained in many quarters, but the
important Commerce Committees had not been moved to act, and the
only bill introduced into either 'House, calling for separation, H.R.
3050 by Representative Dirksen, was not even accorded a hearing.
But by December an unfriendly investigation into airmail subsidies
was begun. by a sub-committee of the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service under the leadership of Representative Rees.s This gave
the airlines' traditional enemies an opportunity to criticize the Board's
policy and extend the issue of subsidy separation. The non-certified
cargo carriers and air freight forwarders welcomed the opportunity to
make their cases heard and criticize the favored position of the certificated airlines under Board policy. Both groups had applications pending for certificates, applications which the certificated carriers openly
opposed.
Appearing against Board policy was the Association of American
Railroads, which severely criticized airmail subsidy policy; the steamship companies represented by the Sea-Air Committee and the Waterman Steamship Company itself, which made a strong appeal for the
Dirksen separation bill; and various air freight lines, which made ap7a A Statement of the Executive Branch of the Government in the General
Field of Aviation, Air Coordinating Committee, Washington, D. C., August 1,
1947.
8 Hearings on Air Mail, House, 80th Congress, 1st Session, Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service.
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peals against what they termed subsidized competition and a subsidized
rate war by the certificated lines to drive them out of business. The
air freight carriers also favored separation of airmail subsidies. Appearing in defense of the airlines and the C.A.B. was Chairman Landis,
various certificated carriers, and the influential Air Transport Association represented by Robert Ramspeck, a former Congressman and
very effective lobbyist. The A.T.A. tended to favor large carrieinterests.
Chairman James Landis defended the intent of the Civil Aeronautics Act to serve objectives other than mail service, -and he opposed
separation until the industry was past the developmental stage. He
testified that any effort to apportion the amounts paid the airlines
according to the various objectives of the Act would be misleading,
and that the entire amount paid is the minimum amount required to
assure continuance of existing mail services (value of service) . Robert
Ramspeck made a very effective defense of the airlines and C.A.B.
, policy, disturbing a seemingly decided Committee chairman.
Because the hearings were before an unsympathetic Post Office Committee, the testimony of the Postmaster General is significant in revealing at that time the attitude of the Post Office Department towards
separation. Although Postmaster Donaldson said he was in favor of some
kind of separation, he defended the C.A.B. and indicated that the Post
Office would prefer bookkeeping separationon the Post Office books
to separate subsidy appropriations by Congress. He preferred to pay
the subsidy out of the Post Office budget. Considering the atmosphere
of the hearings, the Post Office appeared to be quite friendly toward the
C.A.B. Second Assistant Postmaster General Aiken testified that the
Department had first suggested such a separation at its appearance before the President's Air Policy Commission earlier in the year. The
Post Office position seemed to be equivocal, but it was not unfriendly
towards the airlines and the C.A.B.
The C.A.B. had weathered the strains in its industry, Congressional,
and Executive relations in 1947, but general attitudes of economy, efficiency, and a general dislike of subsidies, particularly undisclosed subsidies, had begun to make themselves felt, largely as a consequence,
perhaps of the airline depression, but also as a consequence of hostile
political interest group interactions. Sore points had begun to appear
in Congress, and much depended on the forthcoming reports of the
Presidential and Congressional air studies. These disturbances had
weakened the internal cohesion of the Board. Chairman Landis was
not reappointed in December. Apparently most of his colleagues were
close to the point of resignation. With few exceptions the industry
opposed his reappointment, and strong opposition against him came
from Secretary Harriman of the Commerce Department, and Harriman's relations with the President were politically strong. Landis had
been a strong opponent of any increasing Commerce Department
dominance of the C.A.B.
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When 1948 began there was much talk about a successor to the
former Chairman; yet it was not until April that Joseph O'Connell was
sworn in as the new chairman. The Senate Armed Services Committee
had balked at the President's surprising nomination in January of a
military man, General Kuter, for the position. Between the previous
October and January 1948, two other board members had submitted
letters of resignation, so for a time the C.A.B. was down to three members. It was not until May 13, that its membership was back to the
full five members. These internal dissensions and the changes in personnel, which they necessitated, contributed to the uncertainty of the
Board's relations and, therefore, to the future of subsidy policy. During the course of the new year many new interactions contended to
determine the first change in the Board's attitude and behavior towards
separation in 1949.
In January 1948 the anxiously awaited report of the President's
Air Policy Commission was completed and made public.9 Although
the Commission sidestepped most of the air transport problems, it was
generally sympathetic to airline and C.A.B. problems. Its caution reflected support for the C.A.B., but the Commission had sensed the
strains in the Board and industry relations, and indicated that the
C.A.B. was on trial and had better find out where it was going. It
attributed the present difficulties primarily to an over expansion which
was based on mistaken assumptions of post war traffic, and it did not
think that the situation essentially was different from the pre-war problems. It complimented the Board's action of granting temporary rate
increases in the Spring of 1947 to aid the distressed carriers. The Commission also backed up the Board's stand on subsidy separation, asserting, "We see no advantage now in disturbing a practical working situation,"'1 but it thought it desirable for the C.A.B. in cooperation with
the Post Office to study the cost of air mail service with a view to the
future when most airlines would be able to operate without subsidy
payments.
In March of 1948 the Congressional Aviation Policy Board issued
its report, taking much the same position towards the separation issue
as the President's Commission.1 ' Although it asserted that there was
merit to the contention that the public ought to know what the subsidy was, and that existing policy did not constitute an incentive to
low cost and economy and confused the Post Office budget, the Board
said that it must be recognized that separation was an extremely complicated matter and that probable delays resulting from separation
might cause serious difficulty to "need" carriers and public service. It
said that when the airlines were in sounder financial1 2 condition, consideration could be given to the separation question.
9
Survival in the Air Age, President's Air Policy Commission, January 1,
1948, Washington, D. C.
10 Ibid., p. 103.
11 Senate Report 949, 80th Congress, 2nd Session.
12 Ibid., p. 23.
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Further support for the airline and C.A.B. stand on subsidy separation, also was forthcoming from the important House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee in the form of a report issued to the
House on March 25, 1948, entitled "Public Aid to Air Transportation."'13 The Committee affirmed the policy of public aid to transportation agencies in their early stage of development. Although it held
that there was some merit to the Post Office Department's desire to
remove the confusion from its budget resulting from hidden subsidies,
it thought that this would require elaborate cost survey's which would
have no accurate basis of computation. It even appeared that the Committee was reluctant to admit the existence of any subsidy to the airlines. It said that if the C.A.B. performed its function properly there
would be no subsidy to the carrier, but only to the community or4
service that does not provide sufficient income to pay all the costs. '
Though in somewhat admonishing tones, C.A.B. policy had received
important support from influential Presidential and Congressional
quarters at a time when it was attempting to reorganize itself under
new leadership.
But other Congressional quarters were becoming more hostile to
airmail subsidy policy. The Senate Appropriations Committee and
the House Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service resumed
their attack on the C.A.B. and it appeared that the Post Office Department under the strain of Representative Rees' criticism and Senate
Appropriation Committee criticism was being compelled towards a
stronger position in favor of changing existing policy. Senator Bridges,
chairman of tie Senate Appropriations Committee, and a fellow member, Senator Ferguson, who also was a membei- of an investigating
sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, in April expressed their early hope to investigate
airmail subsidies. Members of the House Appropriations Committee
also expressed their concern over C.A.B. disorganization and policy,
and the latter committee recommended that the Budget Bureau request
for an increase in the Board's budget be cut in half.
In May, 1948, the Rees Post Office Committee of the House issued
a strong report severely criticizing the airlines and the C.A.B. 15 The
report criticized what it called, the high cost of feeder lines, the high
salaries of airline officials, the poor management of some airlines, and
the C.A.B.'s freedom to make experiments without direct action by
the appropriations committees. It contended that separation effected
si*mply by the use of accounting procedures by the Post Office was not
enough, for it said that no agency should be allowed to establish basic
public policy without direct action by Congress.
Approximately a week later the Senate Appropriations Committee
presented a report, in connection with an appropriations bill for the
18 House Report 1612, 80th Congress, 2nd Session.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
15 House Report 1958, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Report on Airmail Sub-
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Treasury and Post Office Departments, in which it strongly endorsed
the findings of the Rees Committee. 16 During hearings on the bill,
Senator Reed in questioning Postmaster General Donaldson said subsidies should be separated, and Donaldson replied that he thought the
time had come to look into separation from postal payments. The Committee report claimed that a major share of the Post Office appropriation was subsidy and recommended that the appropriate committee
study the question of separation with the view in mind of enacting
legislation. It was becoming clear that pressure on the C.A.B. and on
the Post Office was growing in these quarters. The Appropriations
Committees seemed to want a share in policy determination, and legislation requiring the separate appropriation of subsidies would accomplish this purpose. Preliminary work was begun in July, 1948, by the
Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments to study
airmail subsidies, but these efforts did not develop into a full scale
investigation due to the difficulty in getting Senators back from election campaigns.
The attitudes of the political interest groups interested in air mail
policy appeared somewhat more developed in 1948. Hearings held by
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on national
transportation policy in April, 1948 (a continuation of the National
Transportation Inquiry begun by Representative Lea) reveal the major group attitudes, The railroad organizations; the National Industrial Traffic League, an organization of firms engaged in the shipment
of commodities and goods principally by rail; and the National Association of Motor Bus Operators, appeared against subsidies to transportation agencies, and favored a single regulatory commission for all
forms of transportation. Though they were very cautious, the U. S.
Chamber of Commerce and the Transportation Association of America
seemed to be influenced somewhat by railroad attitudes. The Sea-Air
Committee of National Federation of American Shipping Inc., appeared in the interests of the steamship companies which wanted the
right to operate air carriers, and again strongly urged that airmail
subsidies be separated.
The Air Transport Association fresh with material from the reports
of the President's Air Policy Commission and the Congressional Aviation Board was quick to defend the airlines and the C.A.B. Robert
Ramspeck minimized the amount of subsidy in mail pay, and he suggested that since the war airmail rates had been compensatory. If
there was any subsidy he said it was obvious that it went to the users
of the air mail service. The Aircraft Industries Association also testified, backing up the A.T.A. and the airlines.
During the remainder of the year the newly appointed chairman
of the C.A.B. attempted to reunite the Board on an approach to the
still unprofitable airline situation. Joseph O'Connell was a loyal
Administration Democrat, and the President showed additional confi16 Senate Report 1389, 80th Congress, 2nd Session.
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dence in him when he appointed him in August to be the chairman of
the Air Coordinating Committee, thereby filling a vacancy which had
existed since the previous October. In September, the Board finally
decided to authorize the Air Freight Forwarders to operate under a five
year exemption. This, appeared" to be some indication that the C.A.B.
was softening its policy towards the integration of surface and air
agencies in the cargo field. But feeling that excessive competition was
a major factor depriving the airlines of a profitable income, the Board
began a crackdown on the large irregular passenger carriers, which
eventually was to bring more troubles upon it. In the past the nonskeds had operated under a general exemption, but under a new
Economic Order they would have to apply for individual exemption,
and thereby justify their right to receive one. Concern for their coming
fate caused the non-skeds to organize the Independent Air Carrier
Association, whose name they changed in November to the Non-Certified Air Carrier Association, in order to avoid confusion with the air
freight carriers association.
As the year 1948 drew to a close, it appeared that the C.A.B. had
weathered the storms of criticism. Favorable reports on separation
had come from the Presidential Commission and the Congressional
Board, and both Commerce Committees had remained inactive, except
the House Committee which issued a report vindicating the Board.
Moreover, no bills calling for separation had been introduced in either
House. But below the surface, relations were not as satisfactory as they
appeared. The C.A.B. only had been spared the further wrath of the
Appropriations Committees, particularly the Senate Committees, because of Congressional interest in the Presidential election year. It
received a cut in its budget requests, though partly due to an economy
minded Congress.
Concern over the dangers imminent in the separation issue was
reflected within the Commission itself. Memoranda from divisions
within the General Counsel and Economic Bureau of the Commission
to the Board expressed considerable worry over public feeling about
hidden subsidies, and the growing impatience of Congress. Referring
to letters to the Board from Representative Rees and Senator Bridges,
who requested respectively that the Board submit a draft of separation
legislation, and a study of mail subsidies with proposed legislation,
both divisions urged the Board to assign staff members to satisfy these
requests and act as liaison officers between their Committees and the
Board. A growing desire within the Board to satisfy some of the pressures involved in the separation issue also was revealed in a dispute
over economic policy. The Board had pending before it a number of
smaller cases for airmail rate adjustments. The Economic Bureau
argued that the need of these smaller carriers was too serious to postpone in favor of beginning a study of mail costs and taking up the
cases of the Big Five Airlines. The General Counsel thought that the
Board 'ought to defer setting final rates for the smaller carriers and
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begin a cost study and take up the cases of the Big Five, as it was thought
that this course would help the Board meet some of the criticism involved in the separation issue. But it was not until February of 1949
that the Board announced its intentions to do a mail cost study, and it
indicated that it would require a sufficient appropriation to do so. Its
failure to receive adequate appropriations in 1948 had sharpened policy
disputes within the Board.
The period from 1947-48 ended without a change in airmail subsidy
policy. The Board's internal cohesion and external relations had received many strains, but except for the Appropriations Committees,
the Rees Committee in the House, some concern in the Post Office
Department, and the traditionally hostile political interest groups,
Government and industry groups had stood behind C.A.B. policy. The
subsidy issue, however, had grown, and potential interests and general
attitudes were being aroused. The next year was a different story.
The Period During 1949 - A Study of Subsidy Separation

When Congress convened in January 1949, President Truman was
back in the White House, and the Democrats back in control of both
Houses. Since the subsidy question had not been a party issue there
was no break in the continuity of committee interest. Concern in Congress for the airline situation and the subsidy issue actually grew in
intensity. The Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
was feeling the pressure of the Appropriations Committee, and House
Appropriations Committee criticism was threatening the Board's future welfare. The increased clamor of the non-skeds against the Board's
policy of whittling them down also aroused greater attention, and the
C.A.B. action of granting a series of retroactive rate increases in February, some of which were to cover losses incurred by the forced grounding of certain types of planes for safety reasons, received considerable
criticism. It seemed that the C.A.B. subsidy policy was in for more
trouble.
Disturbed by the continued airline plight and pushed by the powerful Appropriations Committee, in January, Senator Johnson of Colorado, the new chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, indicated that the financial condition of the airline industry was so vital 'to national defense that his committee would begin
an investigation, one which probably would go headlong into the question of subsidies. This investigation got started in April and lasted
into 1950.17 It collected thousands of pages of testimony and gave every
interested group a chance to be heard.
Before the Johnson Committee began its work the influential
Hoover Commission submitted most of its reports, and at a crucial time
made a strong recommendation in favor of separation and for the
separate appropriation of airline subsidies. Interest in the attitudes
17 Hearings, Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Airline
Industry Investigation, Parts I-V, 81st Congress, 1st and 2nd Session.
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and behavior of the Hoover Commission was general"' and many of its
recommendations tended to crystallize strong general attitudes and
potential interests which opposed inefficiency, lack of economy, disliked subsidies, and in particular hidden subsidies. The Commission's
attitude on separation did much to nullify the effect of the position
taken by the President's Air Policy Commission and the Congressional
Aviation Policy Board.
Within a few days a number of separation bills were introduced
into both Houses of Congress. On February 21, Representative Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced H.R. 2908, which was said to have
been drafted by Langdon Marvin, then a very active leader of the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Commission. Marvin and Kennedy
had been classmates in college and Marvin previously had been the first
Executive Director of the Congressional Aviation Policy Board for a
short time. On February 25, Senator Johnson himself introduced a bill,
S-1077, which was substantially the same as the Kennedy bill, and on
March 28, he submitted another bill, S-1431, a modified version of his
first bill - a bill for which he hoped to get Administration support.
Events moved rapidly, and in February, 1949, the C.A.B. announced,
with its action granting large retroactive rate increases, that as a part
of its Economic Program for 1949 it was beginning a detailed study
of mail costs for use in determining compensatory mail rates, and that
it also would conduct an investigation of the efficiency of the Big Four.
Senator Johnson indicated that although he was pleased with the
Board's orders relieving the hard pressed carriers, plans for his forthcoming investigation would continue, and the introduction of his first
separation bill followed the Board's action by four days.
Before the Senate Airline Industry Investigation got under way
Representative Rooney and his colleagues on the House Appropriations Committee handled Board members harshly during testimony
on C.A.B. budget requests. The House Committee decided to cut
$360,000 from the Board's requests. Much of this money was needed to
add new positions and make possible the Board's ambitious economic
program, i.e., its mail cost study, etc. The Committee's report quoted
Hoover Commission recommendations pertaining to the C.A.B., and
criticizing its administrative record and procedure as well as its subsidy
policy.' 9 The House passed the Committee bill without amendment
a few days later.
It also was reported in March, 1949, that the President called a
conference of top officials on the request of Postmaster General Donaldson to discuss the pressure on thO Post Office resulting from the
C.A.B. subsidy policy. Donaldson was worried about the difficulty the
Post Office would have in defending the higher appropriations which
would be needed as a result of the Board's recent mail rate increases.
Board Chairman O'Connell was reported to have attended the con18

Post Office Report, The Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of Government, February, 1949.
19 House Report 386, 81st Congress, 1st Session.
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ference. The growing pressure on the Board's relations appeared to be
threatening the future of the Board's anti-separation policy.
On the day after the Presidential conference Chairman O'Connell
addressed the New York City bar association, and personally endorsed
separation of airmail subsidies. It looked as if a C.A.B. change had
taken place, but this was not to be the case for several months, for at
the opening of the Johnson investigation O'Connell was to prove
elusive and disappointing to Senator Johnson. Perhaps the reluctance
of other Board members, and the attitude of the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee, which did not appear to be sympathetic to separation, made him reconsider, but O'Connell indicated
that he believed that his testimony was consistent with the views he
expressed.in his March speech. He took the position that until the
C.A.B. completed its proposed study of mail costs and its proposed
investigation of the efficiency of the Big Four, it was too early to consider separation, and undesirable to pass legislation. He said that the
Board believed that after these investigations were completed it would
be possible to formulate a reasonable policy and make any changes in
20
the Civil Aeronautics Act which might be necessary.
O'Connell also said that unless-the Senate restored the large budget
cut approved by the House, the Board would be seriously handicapped
in its program, and that might mean that it would not be able to go
along with its studies. Senator Johnson admonishingly suggested that
if the Board would press for separation, as he was going to do, that it
might receive better treatment from the Appropriations committees.
O'Connell was visibly disturbed by the Board's relations with the House
Appropriations Committee. Further stress upon the Board's relations with the Senate Commerce Committee was revealed about a week
later when Senator Johnson in a radio interview said that he suspected
certain very large airlines had great influence with certain Board
members.
After O'Connell's testimony, the opposition of the airline industry began to. weaken. It was reported that most of the Big Four and
various other carriers either would not oppose separation of airmail
subsidies or would support separation outright. When Robert Ramspeck appeared before the Johnson Committee for the Air Transport
Association, his usually strong attitude of opposition to separation
changed to one of delaying its realization. Former Chairman Landis
reversed his earlier stand and came out in favor of separation. The
Budget Bureau testified in favor of separation, and said that its being
endorsed in principle should not be held up because of the problem of
putting it into effect. On May 2, 1949, Northwest Airlines, a certificated carrier, testified for separation.
In addition the non-skeds many of whom were facing extinction
under a new Board interpretation of Economic Order 292.1, the socalled "death sentence," which was to go into effect on May 20, 1949,
20 Loc. cit., p. 140.
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made strong appeals to Congress and to the Senate Commerce Committee against C.A.B. policy. Senator Morse testified in their behalf,
charging that the C.A.B. was about to put the only profitable carriers
out of business. Testimony by the non-scheduled carriers themselves,
and support from the Justice Department justifying competition in the
airline industry under anti-trust policy, was effective in stirring Congressmen to request the Board to postpone the effective date of its new
order. Senator Johnson himself wrote the Board and requested that it
put off the "death sentence" until more time had been given to study
the value of the non-skeds to our air transport system and national
defense. The Board later refused most of these requests, but it conceded a little and changed the effective date of its new order until June
20, 1949.
With the industry beginning to split, relations with the Senate
Commerce Committee deteriorating, the Executive agencies swinging
towards separation, and general attitudes becoming intolerable, the
C.A.B. on May 4, 1949, wrote Senator Johnson, (a letter which went
through 11 drafts) suggesting the introduction of a resolution calling
for a study of the problems involved in separating mail pay from subsidy. The Board also suggested that if Congress appropriated funds
and acted soon enough, that it could report back to Congress early in
the next session. The Board could not continue to oppose separation
outright when airline industry attitudes began to change and its relations with one of the Commerce committees was seriously threatened.
It had made a change, but it did not go all the way until 1950, when it
clearly endorsed separation in principle and supported legislation to
put it into effect.
On the day of the Board's letter to Senator Johnson the Senate
Appropriations Committee in reporting on a Post Office appropriations
bill again urged an amendment of the Civil Aeronautics Act to require
the separation of subsidies and their separate appropriation. Two days
later the Senate authorized the Committee on the Post Office and Civil
Service to study airline, steamship, and railroad mail rates. Pressure
also was increasing on the Post Office, and Senator Johnson himself
said on May 3 that he thought the Post Office was reluctant to have
separation as they liked an alibi for deficits.
After the C.A.B. went on record in favor of study of the problems
of separation, the issue became more complex. Within the Board itself
there was little agreement on what basis a separation could be made,,
and its decision reflected its own disagreement as well as the changed
position of the trunk route carriers and the Big Four. There was a
great deal of hesitancy in the Board's new policy, and it preferred to
avoid separation if possible. At the heart of the issue was a disagreement
over what a compensatory mail rate was. The lawyers within the Board
tended to favor a cost basis for computing mail rates, i.e., to show
what the airlines were getting beyond the cost to them of flying the
mail. This basis of separation was recommended by the Hoover Coin-
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mission, and was what the airlines most objected to in separation. The
accountants in the rate division favored determining rates by the "°value
-of service." They contended that it was not possible to determine
mail costs, since airmail costs were joint costs. The separation question
also was complicated by the special situation of the U. S. international
carriers, who competed with foreign subsidized lines, and who operated
under international mail rate agreements. We shall restrict the discussion in this article to the issue as it applied to domestic carriers.
The Board's proposal to Senator Johnson helped to stabilize its
relations with the Senate Commerce Committee. Johnson who at first
seemed to be driving for legislation to effect a separation of subsidies
on May 16, 1949, introduced S.J.R. 92 calling for the study proposed by the Board, and gave his support to this resolution in preference to his previous bills. On May 17 he announced that the C.A.B.
had reversed its positionand now looked with favor on separation.
The Johnson resolution would have authorized $300,000 for the C.A.B.
to pay for the study, and would have required the Board to report to
Congress by March 1950.
The Board's action also improved its relations with the Senate
Appropriations Committee, for early in June the Committee restored
$160,000 of the $360,000 cut made by the House Committee in the
appropriation bill for the C.A.B. budget, and the Senate passed it
without change. The House Committee, however, was not satisfied,
and in July the Conference Committee cut out what the Senate had
restored. As a consequence, C.A.B. appropriations were $160,000 below
the previous year's budget, and $360,000 below Budget Bureau recommendations.
During the remaining hearings held by the Senate Committee in
the Airline Industry Investigation, many witnesses appeared relative
to separation, and in general much of the airline industry appeared to
support separation, but few witnesses had any concrete suggestions for
specific legislative provisions. American and Eastern and other large
airlines decided to support separation partly to avoid being identified
with their less profitable competitors. The feeder lines and smaller
trunk carriers were the most reluctant to accept separation because of
their greater dependence on airmail subsidies. Eastern Airlines even
attempted to use the situation to further its own expansion. Before
the Johnson Committee Rickenbacker offered to operate five of Eastern's competitors at what he called Eastern's "non-subsidy" rate. The
most outspoken airline opponent of separation continued to be Carlton
Putman of Chicago and Southern Airlines. His company had been the
subject of much unfavorable publicity in connection with the Waterman Steamship Company's effort to secure entrance into the airline
business. His line operated under high mail rates. Putman attempted
to minimize and justify subsidies, and he praised the C.A.B. and the
fairness of the Post Office Department. The non-certificated air-cargo
carriers, and two of the newly certificated cargo carriers who had won a
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favorable decision in the Air Freight Case, appeared in favor of separation. The equivocal attitude of the Post Office was indicated in June
when Postmaster General Donaldson testified that the airmail subsidy
was the smallest subsidy they had. It appeared that with many groups
in earnest about separation that the Post Office was somewhat reluctant
to lose a justification for its deficits, yet it said it favored separation.
The Post Office also has had a long history of interest in aviation. It
was the original Government agency to develop the airlines.
The Senate Airline Industry Investigation hearings were concluded
on June 30, 1949. After the change in C.A.B.. attitude towards separation, Senator Johnson favored the passage of S.J.R. 92 calling for a
study. The Board had informed him that it endorsed his resolution,
but.formidable opposition developed to it. Many of the proponents of
separation did not think that it went far enough, whereas many airlines
were hesitant. During June and July meetings were held between the
staff of the Johnson Committee, the Board, and the A.T.A. relative
to the draft of a bill which would be acceptable to all. The Board was
reluctant, however, to go beyond supporting a study of separation,
whereas Johnson again began to reflect the growing pressure for more
satisfactory legislation, i.e., legislation calling for separation.
At this time C.A.B. interactions with the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee increased in frequency. The House Committee had shown little interest in separation and was more sympathetic to the Board's attitude. In July, 1949 the House Committee and
the BoArd held meetings pertaining to the separation issue. The Board's
staff reported to the Transportation sub-committee that it would welcome having an overall airmail study done by a private management
firm, and in July the Board drew up a House Joint Resolution calling
for a study which Representative Crosger, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee introduced early in August; Because of its large
budget cut, the Board had given up the studies which it had announced
in its Economic Program-for 1949, and this situation further strained
its relations with Congress and the proponents of separation legislation.
-Presidential support for separation legislation was forthcoming
after the introduction of Representative Crosser's H.J.R. 331, calling
for a study. Secretary. Sawyer of the Commerce Department endorsed
S-1431, one of the original Johnson bills. The Bureau of the Budget
was of the opinion that the C.A.B. was not convinced of separation,
and would probably have taken the position that S.J.R. 92 was not in
accordance with the President's program had it not been for the friendship which existed between Director Pace and Chairman O'Connell.
The Budget Bureau informed the C.A.B. that its support of S.J.R. 92
was without objection, though S. 1431 and S. 2437 were preferable.
Senator Johnson introduced S. 2437 in August as a compromise bill.
It called for separation for domestic carriers, a study of the U. S. international carrier problems, authorized $100,000 to the C.A.B., and left
the method of separation up to the Board. The C.A.B., however, con-
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tinued to prefer S.J.R. 92 and H.J.R. 331. The Board's relations with
Congress, the Executive, and the 'Senate Commerce Committee became
increasingly unsatisfactory. But, except for the non-skeds and the cargo
carriers, the airlines did not object to the Board's stand on separation.
When considerable opposition developed to S.J.R. 92, and when the
Board failed to go along with separation legislation or proceed with
the studies it had announced in its Economic Program for 1949, Senator Johnson decided to begin a study of his own. In October, 1949 his
Committee contracted with Ernst and Ernst, a private management
consultant firm, to do a pilot study of the feasibility of separation.
Senator Johnson also was anxious to have the Board cooperate with
the Ernsi and Ernst study by assigning liaison people to consult with
them. The C.A.B. refused this request, and a second request that they
reconsider their earlier refusal, 6n the grounds that they could'not
spare any personnel because of budget cuts. Relations between the
Board and the Senate Committee turned. into what some aviation
circles described as a "cold war."
The House Appropriations Committee continued its hostility to
Board policy, and in October began two investigations to inquire into
C.A.B. budget problems and their relation to its backlog of work.
Robert Ramspeck appeared for the A.T.A. and gave some indicatiofi
of industry attitudes toward the Board. He testified that the Board
was understaffed, and although he said that the airlines questioned
the necessity of some of the Board's projects, it did not appear that the
industry objected to the Board's stand on separation.
Interactions with the Commerce Department also became more
unsatisfactory. In Augtst the President requested Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to prepare a report outlining the major policy issues
which needed to be resolved so that national transportation policy*
could achieve maximum effectiveness and consistency, and it was expected that the Commerce Secretary's recommendations might threaten
the future "independence" of the C.A.B.' The Commerce Department
was ambitious to absorb more aviation functions, and with the Board
and Commerce Departments far apart on subsidy policy, the airlines
and the Board were concerned about the effect of a strongly critical
Commerce report. A speech made by Chairman O'Connell in November, 1949, in which he defended the importance to aviation of an "independent" commission, was interpreted as a direct answer to the
forthcoming report. The Sawyer report was issued in December; it
called for subsidy separation and made favorable reference to the need
2
for the consolidation of transportation policy into fewer agencies. '
When the year drew to a close the C.A.B. had not moved beyond
favoring a study of the problems involved in separation. Its attitude
reflected the reluctance, if not the opposition, of most of the airlines
to separation. But in spite of the attitudes and behavior of the Appro21 Issues Involved in a Unified and Coordinated Federal Program for Transportation, U. S. Department of Commerce, December 1, 1949.
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priations Committees and the Johnson Committee, it also reflected
Congressional sentiment, for no separation bills had been reported out
of either Commerce committees. The House Commerce committee was
not in favor of separation, and the one thing that the Johnson Committee was doing, i.e., conducting a study of the feasibility of separation, was exactly what the Board had suggested be done. But neither
the C.A.B. nor the industry had been able to withstand the pressure
of Congressional, Executive agency, and general attitudes calling for
separation. The Board and the industry had given up its outright opposition to separation, but this was not enough, and in 1950 with its relations becoming more unsatisfactory, the C.A.B. clearly endorsed separation in principle and supported legislation to accomplish it.
The PeriodDuring 1950: Separation in Principle
The crystallization of Executive agency attitudes towards separation
was made apparent when the President in his budget message called
for the separation of subsidies and their direct appropriation to the
C.A.B. The Sawyer report and the President's personal endorsement
of separation made it difficult for the Board to hold out any longer.
Chairman O'Connell also was a loyal Administration Democrat. Late
in January he made a speech in which he personally endorsed separation, and thereby indicated that a change in the Board's attitude was
about to take place. At this time the Board was preparing a letter to
submit to the Senate Commerce Committee which would definitely put
it on record favoring separation.
The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce also started to take
a greater interest in the separation issue, partly because it did not wish
to be outdone by the Senate committee, and partly because it felt obligated to do something, since the President had clarified the situation
at least in respect to Administration policy. In January the Committee
informed Board members that it wished to meet with them in executive session to discuss separation, and finding that the Board had
changed its position to favoring separation in principle, it proposed to
hold hearings on two bills pertaining to separation, H.R. 2908, the
original Kennedy bill, and H.J.R. 331, the Crosser resolution calling
for a study of separation. It was even reported that if the House committee could agree on the desirability of separation that it might support the Board's request for additional funds from the House Appropriations Committee to put separation into effect. i But also behind
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee's decision to
hold hearings on separation bills was Appropriations Committee pressure, which some Representatives felt would be appeased if hearings
were held. The Appropriations Committees were consistently the
strongest Congressional proponents of separation.
The C.A.B.'s changed attitude towards separation was made clear
by Chairman O'Connell's testimony during House Commerce Com-
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mittee hearings on February 15, 1950.22 O'Connell said that since the
previous April, the Board had been by no means sure of a method for
accomplishing separation, and for that reason it had favored making a
study of the problems involved. Indicating the Board's new attitude,
he said:
Ten months have now passed since our initial proposal for these
studies, and we are now faced with a decision as to whether to
renew our request or whether to support legislation which lays down
the broad objective of separation, but which will also give us time
and funds necessary to complete the technical research needed to
achieve a satisfactory method
of separation. We have chosen to
28
support such legislation.
Also on the day O'Connell testified both Senate and House Committees received a letter from the Board indicating its support of immediate legislation to affect a separation of mail pay and subsidy and with
suggested revisions to H.R. 2908, and S. 1431. O'Connell testified that
the Board was supporting the Kennedy and Johnson bills because it
believed that on the basis of its experience with the present Big Four
mail case and other work it was doing, that it would be able to develop adequate methods and formulas for separating subsidy from mail
pay and that it could be put into effect about July, 1951 if it received
adequate funds. He estimated that the Board needed about $386,000
more than Budget Bureau recommendations to do the job. He also
reported that its revision of H.R. 2908 was in accord with the program
of the President, and that the Budget Bureau was studying the Board's
request for additional funds.
During the hearings held by the House Commerce Sub-Committee
on Transportation many witnesses appeared in favor of separation,
some of whom doubted the sincerity of the C.A.B.'s changed attitude.
Appearing in favor of separation legislation were: the Post Office Department, which had received a lot of criticism for its past equivocations; the non-skeds; the cargo carriers; the Association of American
Railroads, various shipping interests; the Commerce Secretary; the
Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report; Representative Kennedy;
and others. The Air Transport Association also testified, but there
was so much difference of opinion in the industry at this time that
Stuart Tipton, who represented the Association, said it could not take
a stand either for or against separation. Tipton, however, seemed to
favor a study in preference to separation legislation, as he elaborated
on the difficulties of separating subsidies from mail pay. The A.T.A.
also argued against a strict cost basis for separating subsidies, and although it found the C.A.B. revision 6f H.R. 2908 preferable, it was
not satisfied with the changes which the Board had made so far as cost
standards were concerned.
22 Hearings, on H.R. 2908, and H.J.R. 331, Airmail Subsidies, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Feb. 15, 24, March 9, 15, April 6,
May 24, 1950, 81st Congress, 2nd Session.
23 Ibid., p. 21.
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Representative Kennedy and Langdon Marvin of the Citizens Committee were not satisfied with the Board's attitude and revisions of
H.R. 2908. Kennedy charged that the C.A.B. was the greatest obstacle
to separation and that its request for increased funds to put separation
into effect was an excuse to delay separation if it did not receive all it
asked for. Kennedy and Marvin insisted that the C.A.B. be given a
deadline for separation, and they were not satisfied that the C.A.B.
was not trying to change the "actual cost" standard of the bill by substituting "value of service." Kennedy also was sympathetic to the cargo
carriers and non-skeds and did not want to limit subsidy to those carriers certified to carry mail. The O'Connell revision limited subsidies
to mail carriers as the present law did. It appeared that the Board's
stand on the issue of cost vs. value of service was somewhere between
the industry's views and the more active proponents of separation.
In January, 1950, the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee received the Ernst and Ernst pilot report and was anxiously
awaiting industry and Government reaction to it. Senator Johnson
appeared pleased with thework Ernst and Ernst had done, 24 but the
airlines were reluctant to comment on it, and three months later the
C.A.B. had not yet responded to Senator Johnson's request for comments. It had failed to solidify airline attitudes. The report had
recommended a method for calculating mail rates which was made up
of a fixed formula covering airport handling costs and a variable element of compensation based on poundage and directly related to the
passenger rate structure. In January the Johnson Committee also
heard witnesses from the Defense Department in reply to its request
that they report if it were feasible to segregate any of the airmail subsidy which was benefiting the national defense. Under Secretary of
Defense Stephen J. Early reported that after months of study the Department of Defense considered it impracticable to do so, and that even
if it could, the Department would not be justified in underwriting airmail subsidies alone.
During the period in which the House Commerce Committee
was holding hearings on separation bills, the Senate Committee also
was completing a preliminary study of the cost of airline service on a
community service basis. During the closing week of the previous
session of Congress the Senate Appropriations Committee had expressed considerable concern over the failure of the C.A.B. to separate
subsidies from mail paymetits, and was planning to set up a sub-committee to investigate airmail subsidies until Senator Johnson successfully prevailed upon it to allow his Committee, to report to it early
in the next session. Interest in the separation of subsidies on a community service basis developed out of these relations, and Senator
Johnson also was anxious to fulfill his obligation to the Appropriations
24 Report Covering Prelimina7:y Study, Ernst and Ernst, New York, Janaary
18, 1950.
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Committee. In May, 1950, he issued a report to the chairman of
25
Appropriations Committee.
After the Ernst and Ernst report failed to solidify airline or Board
thinking on a formula for separation, Johnson became strongly interested in putting separation on a community service basis, and he made
a strong recommendation for such a procedure in his report to the
Senate Appropriations Committee. Johnson's attitude was that the
Board had not gone far enough in its new policy, and because his plan
required a large study of station costs before separation could be effected, it developed that he did not favor a separation bill until a
station cost study could be done. Ironically, now that the Board was on
record for separation legislation, the Senate 26 Committee seemed to
favor a study.
The C.A.B. had gone a long ways towards separation, but this did
not satisfy the House Appropriations Committee. In February, Representative Rooney of New York handled Chairman O'Connell very
roughly in committee hearings, and threatened to cut C.A.B. appropriations one million dollars. Other House committeemen were hard
on Board witnesses, and it became apparent that personal animosities
'had much to do with the increased harshness towards the C.A.B. which
had developed within the House Appropriations Committee. Representative Rooney made a searching analysis of C.A.B. practices and
procedures, and he was able to reveal some real weaknesses and even
get Chairman O'Connell and an assistant to make some admissions.
The Committee reported out a bill with $923,000 budget cut, which
meant that the Board might lose about 100 positions.
Behind these excessively bad relations with the House Appropria:
tions Committee was a chance remark O'Connell was reported to have
made the previous fall about the poorness of the New York City delegation in Congress, while attending a testimonial dinner for J. Howard McGrath. O'Connell's comments were carried back to Representative Rooney, who was a Congressman from Brooklyn. There was
growing feeling that Representative Rooney wanted to force Chairman O'Connell's resignation.
With the Johnson Committee working on a community cost basis
for separation and the House Sub-Committee on Transportation expected to reach a decision on separation legislation, airline opposition
to separation, particularly among the small carriers, formed into a
move to head off legislation effecting separation by calling for a study
of the question. On March 10, 1950, 17 certificated airlines, including
9 feeder lines, sent a letter to the Senate Commerce Committee endorsing legislation which would authorize the C.A.B. to make a study
of the feasibility of separation and how it could be accomplished.
Although this was interpreted as a change in attitude among some of
25 Separation of Air-Mail Pay from Subsidy, Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, Committee Print, May 5, 1950.
26 Proposed Senate Action on Air Mail Subsidies, Senator Edwin C. Johnson,
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the feeder lines, Congressmen did not regard it as a support for separation per se. John J. Sullivan, a Washington lawyer, testified in their
behalf at House Commerce Committee hearings in May, and suggested
that H.J.R. 331 be amended to make the airlines a party to the study
which the bill authorized the C.A.B. to undertake. Apparently some
of the airlines were not sure they could rely upon the C.A.B. to see that
their interests would be protected.
The Johnson report to the Senate Appropriations Committee was
well received by the latter Committee, and Johnson testified before
it that he was strongly against the enactment of legislation requiring
separation until a study had been made. With the C.A.B. beginning
to show favor for the Johnson community basis of separation, Board
member Josh Lee made a speech late in May praising it as the most
practical method he knew, it began to appear that the C.A.B. would
be directed to make a study. Yet there was some question as to whether
the C.A.B. would conduct such a study alone. The Johnson Commit-,
tee did not have much confidence in the Board, and the Board did not
wish to conduct a divided study. When the House Sub-Committee on
Transportation reported favorably on H.J.R. 331, it tended to confirm
industry feeling that the C.A.B. would be directed to do a study.
At this time, however, the Board's internal cohesion was seriously
disturbed by the resignation of Chairman O'Connell in connection
with an important international case. The Board and the President
originally had ruled against Pan America's application to acquire
American Overseas Airlines. The President, however, reversed himself and the Board. O'Connell, feeling that'the President had gone
around him, resigned on July 10, 1950. There was considerable
apprehension and uneasiness on the Board and in airline circles about
the Board's future. There was talk about a shift of the C.A.B. to the
Commerce Department and of unification with the C.A.A.
In the meantime the Senate Appropriations Committee decided to
authorize the 'Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to
make a station cost study as a basis for separation. But a surprising
move got under way in the House, and a new separation bill, H.R.
9184, introduced in July, 1950, by Representative Heselton of Connecticut, was successfully reported out of the House Commerce Committee, even though its Transportation Sub-Committee had only one
month earlier reported to the full committee that it favored H.J.R. 331.H.R. 9184 was a rewritten Kennedy bill. But due to the lateness of
the session, and the fact the Johnson Committee was preparing to
contract for a $150,000 study, it was expected that it would not be acted
upon. A- substitute bill, H.R. 9305, which had airline backing, was
made ready by those who opposed separation in case a compromise
proved necessary. The House action was all the more surprising because the House Commerce Committee had always been unfavorable
to separation, whereas the Senate Commerce Committee had favored it.
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In September Delos Rentzel, former head of the C.A.A., who had
been slated to be an Under Secretary of Commerce, was appointed
Chairman of the C.A.B. The President had been unable to find a
suitable candidate for the position, and had drafted Rentzel, who was
popular with the Commerce Committees and well regarded by the
industry, for the job. The President also thought highly of him.
Senator Johnson was pleased with the appointment, and during testimony on Rentzel's confirmation, he spoke of how C.A.B. relations
with the Commerce Committee had reached a low ebb, and how he
looked forward to their improvement. The new chairman proved to
be effective in bettering the Board's relations and in improving its
internal cohesion.
With the elections drawing near it looked as if further action on
separation legislation would have to wait until the new 82nd Congress
convened. The Senate Appropriations Committee's authorization to
the Johnson Committee to conduct a $200,000 community cost study
had become law with the passage in October of the Omnibus Appropriation Bill, and the Johnson Committee had already contracted with
Ernst and Ernst to do another study. But the President and other
groups sought legislation from the "lame duck" Congress. Although
it was thought to be too late to get legislation through the Senate so
that a bill could become law, especially in view of the fact that the
Johnson Committee had just begun a costly study, it was thought that
passage of separation legislation in the House would tend to spur passage of a bill during the 82nd Congress.
\
The Board did not give much positive support to this effort; though
it recommended important amendments to the Heselton bill which was
finally passed in December, 1950, it did not oppose this legislative
move. Chairman Rentzel told the Senate after the House had acted
that he thought that there were different problems in the international
field. The version of the Heselton bill which was passed in the House
was amended to satisfy most of the Board's objections, i.e., the cost
standard was modified, only mail carriers were-made eligible for subsidies, and the Board was given more time to effect separation. The
Hall substitute bill, H.R. 9305, which had airline support, had been
defeated, but many of its provisions were adopted as amendments to
the bill which was passed.
Though the Senate Committee voted not to consider the Heselton
bill after -it had passed in the House, Senator Johnson had assisted its
passage, by unexpectedly giving his support to it in a letter to Representative Kennedy. It appeared that Johnson knew the Senate would
not act, and thought that it would be a good thing to get the House on
record in favor of separation. As the year drew to a close the Board
and the domestic carriers were showing increased favor towards Johnson's community service basis for separation, and relations with his
committee had improved noticeably.
The C.A.B.'s February decision to support separation in principle

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

.and legislation which would effect it had reflected the growing pressures on its external relations. When 1950 ended it did not appear
that any new change in the Board's policy was in the offing. Although
the Board's relations with the House Appropriations Committee
reached a near breaking point there was little it could do to adjust to
the attitudes of that Committee. Beneath the surface of its relations
with the committee were several personal animosities which were not
relieved until Chairman O'Connell left the Board in July. The attitudes and behavior of the House Appropriations Committee, however,
were effective in straining the Board's relations with the industry and
with other Congressional groups, and in particular with the Johnson
Committee. They were instrumental in leading. to the Chairman's
resignation, and they caused heavy budget cuts.
But once the Board had taken a clear stand on separation its policy
reflected a certain degree of stability in the character of its interaction
patterns, particularly after a new Chairman free from the turmoils of
the past came to the Board. In respect to its Congressional relations,
Board policy stood somewhere between the attitudes of the Commerce
Committees. The positions of these Committee's shifted, but in somewhat opposite directions. C.A.B. relations with the Executive agencies
and the President tended to place the Board in the position of seeming
reluctant to separation by comparison to their more definite attitude
to see it put into effect, and it also appeared that the Board's relations
with the general attitudes and potential interests which were organized were about of a similar nature. The C.A.B.'s policy towards separation, however, was somewhat ahead of most of the airline industry,
but as the year drew to a close the industry progressed closer to the
Board's position. C.A.B. policy towards the separation of subsidy from
mail pay tended to be the lowest common denominator of certain
Congressional, industry, Executive, and general group attitudes and
behavior.
SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

We have attempted to describe certain changes in C.A.B. policy
towards the issue of the separation of air mail subsidies in terms of
Truman's theory of "group politics." From our discussion what answers have we found to our original questions?
What explicative value does Truman's theory have? The answer
to this question is related to another question which we posed "Why
did the C.A.B. change its mind and come out in favor of subsidy separation?" Truman's theory of politics makes the political Acientist's
job primarily one of describing the political attitudes and behavior of
people, i.e., the attitudes and behavior of people in respect to the
institutions of Government. But since any individual attitude or action
is determined by and is part of various patterns of attitudes and behavior, which are defined as groups, the nature of the political process
is a mosaic of groups contending with each other. Interaction is the
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most significant aspect of attitudes and behavior. Any one attitude
or action is determined by the environment of attitudes and behavior
patterns from which it is born.
Truman's theory therefore explains political events by the patterns
of attitudes and behavior which determine them. The answer to the
question, "Why did the C.A.B. change its policy in 1949?" is "Its policy
is the result of certain interaction patterns." The answer to a specific
question is made by identifying the determining group attitudes and
behavior. In respect to the C.A.B.'s shifts in policy we found that the
Board's attitudes and behavior reflected the major group attitudes with
which, by virtue of its particular institutional character and relations,
it had to contend. The Board's policy seemed to be a function of certain industry, Congressional, Executive, and general attitudes, and over
a period of time it remained unchanged until the differing attitudes
of these groups made themselves felt through the Board's relations.
The three propositions27 which we said should follow from our
application of Truman's ideas to the area of policy under discussion
we found generally to be true. In general terms we found that changes
in Board policy did reflect changes in the attitudes and behavior of
the groups with "which the C.A.B. carried on its most important relations. Although the major groups with which the C.A.B. had relations
usually did not agree on separation policy, and though in many instances they opposed each other, the degree to which the Board changed
its attitudes and behavior reflected the degree to which the attitudes
and behavior of these groups were changing. Recognizing that the
C.A.B. itself as a group was a factor in determining what its subsidy
separation policy was going to be, i.e., it had something to contribute
since interactions are two way streets, the success of the Board in
maintaining its attitudes under similar conditions did appear to be a
function of its internal cohesion. Although it is difficult to determine,
the C.A.B.'s success in preventing changes in its policy, which had been
an institutional pattern of behavior, tended to reflect the degree of
internal cohesion it was able to muster.
Within a society which is as highly organized as ours, and in which
groups play such an important role, the emphasis on groups is rewarding. The Truman theory recognizes the power of groups in shaping
public policy, and offers a definition of groups which provides a broad
framework within which the formulation of public policy may be
described.
In so far as Truman's theory is objectively concerned with describing the correlations and the "causal" relations between particular political events and attitudes and behavior which may be defined and identified as group characteristics, it has real value in getting at the nature
of political life, and on the basis of a sufficient knowledge of particular group relationships with Government derived from such an aplroach, it should be possible to anticipate some of the character of
27 See page 383, supra.
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future events. A sufficient knowledge of the Board and the groups
with which it carries on its most important relations should net one
more understanding about what future C.A.B. policy is going to be
than an approach to the question of policy prediction which neglects
such a basis of knowledge. Perhaps Truman's theory is the formulation of what an experienced lobbyist might call the obvious, but in so
far as it does so systematically, thereby simplifying and refining knowledge, this is to its credit.
Although we have not brought our policy discussion up to the
present on the basis of our general application of Truman's theoretical framework, we may conclude that the Board's present policy on
separation should not change unless at least industry and Commerce
Committee forces start moving for a change. What their attitudes are
also will depend upon Appropriations and Post Office committee
attitudes, and upon Executive and general attitudes. In 1951, the
C.A.B. announced an administrative separation for domestic carriers
which went into effect in September. 8 During 1951, the 'Senate also
passed a separation bill, S. 436, which the Board originally endorsed
but later opposed. The House Commerce Committee was slow to
hold hearings and only reported out a substitute bill late in the session after bitter controversy within the committee. Efforts to bring
this bill up on the floor of the House during the closing days of the
session failed when the Board objected to it. and the Bureau of the
Budget threatened a Presidential veto. The differences between the
Senate passed S. 436 and the House substitute as reported out, were
not substantial, but both differed radically from the Heselton bill,
which the House had passed during the 2nd Session of the 81st Congress. Even though the C.A.B. supports separation legislation of the
Heselton bill type, it tends to remain satisfied with its present policy
solution; and with Appropriations and Post Office committee attitudes
cooled down, the industry adjusted to the present arrangement, and
general attitudes relatively inactive, it appears that no change in the
present situation is likely to take place for some time. Subsidy separation must gain more active support than it presently has to achieve
a legislative solution. But when a change does occur, it will be determined by the major group interactions we have described.
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